First Principles. Spencer Herbert

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       Herbert Spencer

      First Principles

      Published by Good Press, 2019

       [email protected]

      EAN 4057664648457

Table of Contents

       PART I. THE UNKNOWABLE.

       CHAPTER I. RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

       CHAPTER II. ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS.

       CHAPTER III. ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS.

       CHAPTER IV. THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE.

       CHAPTER V. THE RECONCILIATION.

       PART II. LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE.

       CHAPTER I. LAWS IN GENERAL.

       CHAPTER II. THE LAW OF EVOLUTION. [8]

       CHAPTER III. THE LAW OF EVOLUTION, CONTINUED.

       CHAPTER IV. THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION.

       CHAPTER V. SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE.

       CHAPTER VI. THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER.

       CHAPTER VII. THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION.

       CHAPTER VIII. THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE. [12]

       CHAPTER IX. THE CORRELATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES.

       CHAPTER X. THE DIRECTION OF MOTION.

       CHAPTER XI. THE RHYTHM OF MOTION.

       CHAPTER XII. THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EVOLUTION.

       CHAPTER XIII. THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS. [16]

       CHAPTER XIV. THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS.

       CHAPTER XV. DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION.

       CHAPTER XVI. EQUILIBRATION.

       CHAPTER XVII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

PART I.

       THE UNKNOWABLE.

       Table of Contents

CHAPTER I.

       RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

       Table of Contents

      § 1. We too often forget that not only is there “a soul of goodness in things evil,” but very generally also, a soul of truth in things erroneous. While many admit the abstract probability that a falsity has usually a nucleus of reality, few bear this abstract probability in mind, when passing judgment on the opinions of others. A belief that is finally proved to be grossly at variance with fact, is cast aside with indignation or contempt; and in the heat of antagonism scarcely any one inquires what there was in this belief which commended it to men’s minds. Yet there must have been something. And there is reason to suspect that this something was its correspondence with certain of their experiences: an extremely limited or vague correspondence perhaps; but still, a correspondence. Even the absurdest report may in nearly every instance be traced to an actual occurrence; and had there been no such actual occurrence, this preposterous misrepresentation of it would never have existed. Though the distorted or magnified image transmitted to us through the refracting medium of rumour, is utterly unlike the reality; yet in the absence of the reality there would have been no distorted or magnified image. And thus it is with human beliefs in general. Entirely wrong as they may appear, the implication is that they germinated out of actual experiences—originally contained, and perhaps still contain, some small amount of verity.

      More especially may we safely assume this, in the case of beliefs that have long existed and are widely diffused; and most of all so, in the case of beliefs that are perennial and nearly or quite universal. The presumption that any current opinion is not wholly false, gains in strength according to the number of its adherents. Admitting, as we must, that life is impossible unless through a certain agreement between internal convictions and external circumstances; admitting therefore that the probabilities are always in favour of the truth, or at least the partial truth, of a conviction; we must admit that the convictions entertained by many minds in common are the most likely to have some foundation. The elimination of individual errors of thought, must give to the resulting judgment a certain additional value. It may indeed be urged that many widely-spread beliefs are received on authority; that those entertaining them make no attempts at verification; and hence it may be inferred that the multitude of adherents adds but little to the probability of a belief. But this is not true. For a belief which gains extensive reception without critical examination, is thereby proved to have a general congruity with the various other beliefs of those who receive it; and in so far as these various other beliefs are based upon personal observation and judgment, they give an indirect warrant to one with which they harmonize. It may be that this warrant is of small value; but still it is of some value.

      Could we reach definite views on this matter, they would be extremely useful to us. It is important that we should, if possible, form something like a general theory of current opinions; so that we may neither over-estimate nor under-estimate their worth. Arriving at correct judgments on disputed questions, much depends on the attitude of mind we preserve while listening to, or taking part in, the controversy; and for the preservation of a right attitude, it is needful that we should learn how true, and yet how untrue, are average human beliefs. On the one hand, we must keep free from that bias in favour of received ideas which expresses itself in such dogmas as “What every one says must be true,” or “The voice of the people is the voice of God.” On the other hand, the fact disclosed by a survey of