The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. William James

tion>

       William James

      The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy

      Published by Good Press, 2019

       [email protected]

      EAN 4057664112453

Table of Contents

       PREFACE.

       THE WILL TO BELIEVE 1

       IS LIFE WORTH LIVING 32

       THE SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY 63

       REFLEX ACTION AND THEISM 111

       THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM 145

       THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE 184

       GREAT MEN AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT 216

       THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS 255

       ON SOME HEGELISMS 263

       WHAT PSYCHICAL RESEARCH HAS ACCOMPLISHED 299

       INDEX 329

       ESSAYS

       POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

       IS LIFE WORTH LIVING?[ 1 ]

       THE SENTIMENT OF RATIONALITY.[ 1 ]

       I.

       REFLEX ACTION AND THEISM.[ 1 ]

       THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM.[ 1 ]

       THE MORAL PHILOSOPHER AND THE MORAL LIFE.[ 1 ]

       GREAT MEN AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT.[ 1 ]

       THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUALS.

       ON SOME HEGELISMS.[ 1 ]

       WHAT PSYCHICAL RESEARCH HAS ACCOMPLISHED.[ 1 ]

       INDEX.

       By the Same Author

PREFACE.

       Table of Contents

      At most of our American Colleges there are Clubs formed by the students devoted to particular branches of learning; and these clubs have the laudable custom of inviting once or twice a year some maturer scholar to address them, the occasion often being made a public one. I have from time to time accepted such invitations, and afterwards had my discourse printed in one or other of the Reviews. It has seemed to me that these addresses might now be worthy of collection in a volume, as they shed explanatory light upon each other, and taken together express a tolerably definite philosophic attitude in a very untechnical way.

Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I should call it that of radical empiricism, in spite of the fact that such brief nicknames are nowhere more misleading than in philosophy. I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square. The difference between monism and pluralism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy. Primâ facie the world is a pluralism; as we find it, its unity seems to be that of any collection; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an effort to redeem it from that first crude form. Postulating more unity than the first experiences yield, we also discover more. But absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains undiscovered, still remains a Grenzbegriff. "Ever not quite" must be the rationalistic philosopher's last confession concerning it. After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity of the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare externality and datum to the other. The negative, the alogical, is never wholly banished. Something—"call it fate, chance, freedom, spontaneity, the devil, what you will"—is still wrong and other and outside and unincluded, from your point of view, even though you be the greatest of philosophers. Something is always mere fact and givenness; and there may be in the whole universe no one point of view extant from which this would not be found to be the case. "Reason," as a gifted writer says, "is but one item in the mystery; and behind the proudest consciousness that ever reigned, reason and wonder blushed face to face. The inevitable stales, while doubt and hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is wild—game-flavored as a hawk's wing. Nature is miracle all; the same returns not save to bring the different. The slow round of the engraver's lathe gains but the breadth of a hair, but the difference is distributed back over the whole curve, never an instant true—ever not quite."[1]

      This is pluralism, somewhat rhapsodically expressed. He who takes for his hypothesis the notion that it is the permanent form of the world is what I call a radical empiricist. For him the crudity of experience remains an eternal element thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact. Real possibilities, real indeterminations, real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes, and escapes, a real God, and a real moral life, just as common-sense conceives these things, may remain in empiricism as conceptions which that philosophy gives up the attempt either to 'overcome' or to reinterpret in monistic form.

      Many of my professionally trained confrères will smile at the irrationalism of this view, and at the artlessness of my essays in point of