Prohibition of Interference. Book 6. Samurai Code. Макс Глебов

tanks. I think that's just the beginning. Comrade Commander-in-Chief, the troops urgently need effective means to combat the enemy's new equipment. We expected the Germans to do something to counterbalance our KVs and T-34s, but we still couldn't assume that. Perhaps the 85mm anti-aircraft guns could handle their armor, but that is a last resort – they are always in short supply for anti-aircraft defense as it is.”

      “Comrade Zhukov, brief Comrades Morozov and Ustinov with this information. We'll come back to this matter again tonight, but in the meantime, continue your report. I am interested in the preparations for the attack on Kiev.”

* * *

      We moved farther and farther west. For all the questionable combat effectiveness of the Chinese riverboats, the help of Chiang Kai-shek's men came in handy. We were placed on the decks, and the wounded were finally able to rest from the constant jolting. In addition, they were immediately examined by an elderly Chinese man who informed us that he was a field surgeon. This doctor spoke Russian, with a monstrous accent, but at least he was understandable. After giving the necessary care to the most difficult patients, he took over for me.

      Примечания

      1

      In real history, on the night of August 9, 1942, Vice Admiral Mikawa's squadron of seven cruisers and one destroyer defeated a squadron of cruisers and destroyers of the United States and Australia, which outnumbered the Japanese, in the battle off Savo Island. Not a single Japanese ship was sunk. The Allies lost four heavy cruisers. Another cruiser and two destroyers sustained serious damage. 1,077 Australian and American sailors were killed. Japanese casualties were limited to 58 men. Three cruisers sustained moderate damage. This undoubted and striking victory, however, was not used by Vice-Admiral Mikawa to disrupt the landing of American troops on Guadalcanal Island, although all the conditions were in place to do so. The clearly erroneous decision not to continue the attack and to retreat was influenced by fears of being hit by aircraft from American aircraft carriers after sunrise.

      Mikawa did not know that the enemy carrier formation had left the combat zone, having suffered serious losses in deck fighters, and did not take the opportunity to destroy Allied transport ships at anchorages off the coast of Guadalcanal with impunity. As a result, the Japanese missed their chance to fundamentally change the course of the battle for the Solomon Islands and New Guinea.