Who set Hitler against Stalin?. Nikolay Starikov

(to whom we will return presently), returning home, can’t get milk for his little son. Milk is dispensed only for ration tickets, and those are nearly unavailable. The only solution for him is to order huge amounts of coffee at a five-star hotel and pour out the tiny portions of cream into a bottle for his son[37].

      Those who would like to know more about the life of Germans in the years immediately following the First World War are strongly advised to read the novels of Erich Maria Remark, in particular, The Black Obelisk. This novel has some vivid descriptions of situations when, receiving one’s salary before lunchtime, one would make directly for a nearby shop – there would be another zero added to the price tags after lunch.

      But that’s the life of ordinary German citizens. The Nazi met with many financial hardships, too, at first. The first storm troops were not able to hold parades in winter, for they had no warm boots. But little by little things went better. Higher storm troop officers and party functionaries were now paid in foreign currency[38]. This meant stability and a sustainable, decent life in an inflation-strangled Germany. Like any other party, the NSDAP collected contributions and donations. Storm troopers went about the streets with coin mugs, and one was supposed to buy a ticket to attend one of Hitler’s speeches that gave in circuses, like some actor. All that was there, for sure, but such income was received in the Deutschemark that was continuously losing its value. And the good old ladies also made donations in Deutschemarks. “No party could then live on membership fees paid in Deutschemarks”, as has been characteristically pointed out by historians[39]. And still we are never the wiser about who actually gave US dollars and Swiss francs to Hitler. Let’s try to find an answer ourselves then. By understanding whose interests Hitler and his party suited most nicely we can guess who financed their development and rise to power. How do we know whose game Hitler was going to play, you will ask? Simple enough – we can read his programme book (which the “unfortunate” French spies failed to do). So let’s get down to Mein Kampf.

      As it is, the book has many threads woven together – personal reminiscences of a retired soldier, anti-Semitic statements, all in one heap. But we are interested only in the author’s political views – anything that can throw light on his political plans. Hitler’s sponsors did not enjoy our present position to see into the future and foretell the result of his political career.

      The book opens with an analysis of the causes of Germany’s defeat in the First World War.

      If European territorial policy could be carried out against Russia only with England as an ally, then, on the other hand, colonial and world trade policy was conceivable only against England with the help of Russia. <…> However, one did not at all think of forming an alliance with Russia against England, nor with England against Russia, for in both cases the end would have been war <…>[40].

      This sole statement reveals the plain direction that Hitler’s politics was taking. In order to be able to take something from somebody, Germany must ally with someone else that it was not going to take anything from. The Kaiser’s diplomats had not thought this far, and had got the country embroiled in a war against the whole world.

      Since, however, it was generally not desired to have anything to do with planned war preparation, the acquisition of territory in Europe was abandoned owing to the fact that instead of this there was devotion to colonial and trade policy, and an otherwise possible alliance with England was sacrificed, without, however, logically getting backing from Russia, and finally the government stumbled into the World War, abandoned by all<…>.

      Surely, one can’t win if one struggles against all. That is the first conclusion the author arrives at. Then he proceeds to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of his country’s enemies.

      We must at last become entirely clear about this: the German people’s irreconcilable mortal enemy is and remains France.

      But Germany’s other enemy from the Triple Entente, Britain, is characterised using a completely different modality. It is even vindicated.

      Precisely in order not to allow France’s power to grow too great, participation in her hankerings for loot was England’s sole possible form of action for herself. In reality England did not achieve her war aim.

      The sons of “perfidious Albion” had always attempted to weaken the strongest country on the continent. Quite recently, it had been Germany. But now that it had been ruined and devastated, it no longer presented any threat for the British. In Hitler’s view, now Britain could only be looking askance at France!

      Thus the fruit of the struggle against the development of German power was politically the precipitation of French hegemony on the continent.

      However, the pillars of British politics are forged not for decades but for centuries. And so, Hitler reflects, Britain has no reason to back out this time.

      Cover of the first edition of Mein Kampf, the pivotal book of the Third Reich. The crucial political idea is that Britain must be Germany’s primary ally

      England’s desire is and remains the prevention of the immoderate rise of any continental power to world political importance; that is, the maintenance of a fixed balance of power relation among European States; for this seems to be the premise of British world hegemony.

      Here the author comes to another conclusion – the crucial one in his book, the one it was written for.

      Whoever undertakes, from the above viewpoint, an estimate of the present possibilities of an alliance for Germany must reach the conviction that the last practicable tie remaining is only English support.

      Hitler wants to let bygones be bygones, without looking back at Britain’s old sins. The 1918 defeat, the revolution, the sunken German fleet, the exorbitant reparations – all that he was prepared to forgive and forget. For the British hadn’t done all that out of spite; nothing personal, only business.

      Now, alliance policies are not advanced from considerations of backward-looking discords, but rather fructified by a knowledge of past experiences. Experience, however, should now have taught us that alliances for the achievement of negative goals suffer from internal weaknesses.

      Think positive, that’s what he is basically saying! No need to bear a grudge against the British, no need to expect them to pat you on the shoulder. One can’t expect them to turn suddenly pro-German, a well. Such politicians have never existed in England.

      Every Englishman as a statesman is, of course, first of all an Englishman, every American an American, and no Italian will be found prepared to play any other politics than pro-Italian politics. Whoever, then, thinks of succeeding in concluding alliances with foreign nations on the basis of a pro-German sentiment of their leading statesmen is either a jackass or a fraud. The premise for the linking of national fates never lies in mutual respect or even congeniality, but in a perspective of mutual expediency for both contracting parties. That is, let us say, however invariably an English statesman pursues pro-English policies and never pro-German, quite definite interests of these pro-English policies can, for the most diverse reasons, duplicate pro-German interests.

      The notion of “duplicate interests” is that launch-pad that can propel Germany into the bright future and Hitler to the political Olympus in his country.

      England desires no German world power, but France desires no power at all called Germany: a really quite essential difference. Today, however, we are not fighting for position as a world power, but we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland, our national unity, and for daily bread for our children. If, with this viewpoint, we want to keep our eyes open for European allies, then there remain practically two States: England and Italy.

      It is curious that both Soviet and Western historians and politicians never investigate Hitler’s devoted affection for Britain. It is hardly mentioned at all, or but in a few words, for example, those of Winston Churchill: “England and Italy

37

Hanfstengel, E. Hitler: Lost years. M., 2007. P. 23–24.

38

Fest, I. Hitler. Perm, 1993. V.1. P. 272.

39

Heiden, K. Hitler’s rise to power. M., 2004. P. 178.

40

Hereinafter Mein Kampf is quoted from the Reynal And Hitchcock English-language edition (New York, 1941) available from the Internet Archive Universal Library here: https://archive.org/details/meinkampf035176mbp (Translator’s note)