Publick natural Good, the Effect of human Actions, is farther explain’d. §5.
The Stoicks
are reprehended, for denying what we call natural Good, to be at all Good, in order to support their Assertion, that Virtue was the only Good. Hobbes
also is shewn to contradict himself; who contends, that Civil Laws are the only Rules, by which we can distinguish between Good and Evil: and the difference between natural Good and Evil is farther explain’d, to the end of § 9. § 10.
The Sanction is briefly handled, as far as is necessary to explain the foregoing Definition. § 11. Justinian’
s Definition of Obligation is examin’d, and resolv’d into the Will of the Legislator, annexing Rewards and Punishments to his Laws. Therefore in § 12.
are traced the Rewards, that are naturally connected with a Pursuit of the publick Good; and, in the first place, those which are contain’d in the Happiness of the human Mind. Here it is prov’d by many Arguments, that the greatest Happiness of our Mind consists in the Exercise and inward Sense of universal Benevolence, to the end of § 17.
It is afterwards prov’d, that this End is agreeable to the Will of God, and that he will reward those who co-operate with him, and punish those who oppose him: and Epicurus’
s Assertion, that the World is not govern’d by Providence, is confuted from Principles known by the Light of Nature, and often acknowledg’d by the Epicureans
themselves, to the end of § 23.
It is also prov’d, that Penalties, besides those inflicted by the Society, await those who attempt any thing against the common Good, to the end of § 31.
In § 32.
these Conclusions are illustrated from opposite Cases. In § 33, 34.
from Parallel Cases. In §. 35.
it is prov’d, that God and Men are the chief, and in a manner the general, Causes of that Happiness, which each Individual necessarily desires; and that therefore they can never be safely neglected. In § 36.
two Objections are propos’d. 1.
That the Punishments and Rewards seem uncertain, which we have affirm’d to be the Sanctions of that Law, which enjoins the promoting the common Good. Plain Proofs of these Punishments are produc’d to the end of § 39.
In these Sections, the difference of our Method, from that of Mr. Hobbes,
is made apparent; and it is prov’d, that no Man can have a right to claim any thing as his Property, unless it be first granted, that the Laws of Nature do, in a State of Nature, oblige to the performance of external Actions conformable to them; and that therefore Hobbes
does expressly contradict himself, whilst he contends, that in a State of Nature there are natural Rights binding, with respect to external Actions, and yet denies that the Laws of Nature do in that State oblige to the performance of external Actions. In § 40.
it is prov’d, that Rewards or positive Advantages are necessary Consequences of promoting the publick Good; particularly, that Peace amongst Rationals does not necessarily presuppose War, as Mr. Hobbes
asserts; and that it is a Continuation only of that Concord which is natural among Rationals, agreeing in the same Means to obtain the same End; but that War is to be defin’d from its Absence, in opposition to Hobbes.
In § 41.
greater Rewards are enumerated, and the Principles of Epicurus’
s Natural Philosophy, by which he endeavours to disprove the Providence of God, are briefly refuted. In § 43.
is prov’d, that a Desire of promoting the publick Good is the Foundation of all civil Societies; and that therefore all the Advantages of living under civil Government are to be reckon’d among the natural Rewards of this Desire. Hence is shewn, § 44.
that it may be prov’d, that God designs to oblige Men to the performance of such Actions; the whole Argument being reduc’d to a Syllogism. In § 45.
the second Objection is answer’d; and it is prov’d, that our Method of deducing the Sanction of the Laws of Nature, from the Connexion of our Happiness with such actions as promote the common Good, does not suppose, that we prefer our selves before all others. The End or adequate Effect of the Law is in all equitable Judgment to be preferr’d to the Sanction, as it respects only particular Persons; this is explain’d to the end of § 49. § 50.
Examines Hobbes’
s Reason for denying, that the Laws of Nature do oblige, in a State of Nature, to the performance of external Actions, namely, for want of Security. It is prov’d, that in order to make an Obligation valid, a perfect Security from all Fear is not necessary, and that Societies themselves do not afford such a Security: But it is prov’d, that even the State of Nature affords a comparative Security, which is greater than what arises from Hobbes’
s State of War. It is shewn, that its being presum’d by Civil Laws, that Men are good, till the contrary appears, overthrows Hobbes’
s Doctrine, to the end of § 52.
In § 53.
it is prov’d, that Hobbes
acknowledges, that every Man has a Right to commit Treason, in this, that he affirms it not to be a Transgression of the Law of the State, but of the Law of Nature. § 54.
Proves, that by such Doctrine is taken away all Obligation, and consequently all use, of Leagues between different Empires, as being in a State of Nature and of War, with respect to one another. § 55. Hobbes
destroys the Security of Ambassadors, and of all Commerce. In § 56.
is shewn, that a Commonwealth cannot be fram’d or preserv’d by such Men, as Hobbes
contends, that all Men are. In § 57.
it is concluded from these Premises, that this is the one Fundamental Law of Nature, That the common Good of Rationals is to be promoted.
Chapter VI
In the four first Sections are deriv’d from that general Precept, all those Laws which concern the Happiness, 1. Of different Nations, which have any mutual Intercourse. 2. Of single States. 3. Of any smaller Societies whatsoever, as of Families and Friends. In §5. is shewn, that the same general Law directs human Actions of every kind, as well those of the Understanding and Will, as those of the Body, which are govern’d and determin’d by the Mind. Hence is prov’d, that by this Law is enjoin’d, in the Understanding, Prudence in all kinds of Actions, as well relating to God as Man; whence arise, 1. Constancy of Mind, and its several Branches. 2. True Moderation, which comprehends Integrity and Industry. In the Will, from an Union of Prudence with Benevolence, arise Equity, the Government of all the Affections, and those Virtues which regard the special Laws of Nature. In §9. is explain’d the Difference between Actions necessary to this End, (the common Good,) and Actions indifferent; wherein there is room for Liberty, and for the Interposition of the supreme Powers.
Chapter VII
In the three first Sections is handled more at large the Origin of Dominion, as well over Things as Persons; and it is deduc’d from that Law of Nature, which enjoins the making a Division of Rights, and the preserving it when made. In §4. is shewn, that this Law is suppos’d in the very Definition of Justice. Thence is deduc’d (§ 5.) the Difference between Things or Persons sacred, and such as are allotted to common Uses. In §6. the Origin of the divine Dominion is deduc’d from the Judgment of the divine Wisdom, which is analogous to, or resembles, this Law of Nature. It is prov’d, that these Conclusions of human Reason agree with the Judgment which God himself makes. The 7th Section renders a Reason, why it was thought proper to add any thing to the common Doctrine, which derives God’s Right of Dominion over the Creatures, from his having created them. In §8, 9. from the Law of Nature, appointing the introducing and the preserving of Dominion, many things are deduc’d concerning a plenary Division of Dominion, as well over Things as Persons and their Labours, to be made, (either by Consent, Arbitration, or Lot,) or to be preserv’d: Concerning transferring Rights by Covenants; the Rise of their obligatory Force, and that it reaches not to Things unlawful. In § 10. is shewn, that from the same Law is deriv’d the Obligation to Benevolence, Gratitude, a limited Self-Love, and the natural Affection of Parents towards their Children, and to constitute a civil Power, (§ 11.) which may controul that of the Subject: That it is necessary (§ 12.) that the forming and preserving States be enjoin’d by a Law of Nature, obliging to the performance of external Actions, before such States are formed. Whence, in § 13. are deduc’d other Corollaries of the utmost Importance, as well in Things Sacred, as Civil.
Chapter VIII
In §1. is shewn, that all Obligation to the exercise of moral Virtues flows immediately from hence, that such Actions are enjoin’d by the Law of Nature. From the Law, requiring the Settlement of private Dominion, or Property, in order to the common Good, are inferred
