The True Military Power of North Korea. Donald Trump

       Andrew Scobell, John M. Sanford, Daniel A. Pinkston, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Congress, Donald Trump

      The True Military Power of North Korea

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      2020 OK Publishing

      EAN 4064066309770

Table of Contents

       North Korea’s Military Threat

       Summary

       Introduction

       Conventional Forces

       Unconventional Forces

       Overall Conclusions

       The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program

       Summary

       Introduction

       DPRK National Strategy and Motivations

       Historical Background of DPRK Missile Development

       Institutional Setting

       Conclusion

       U.S. Government Policy Toward North Korea

       Countering the North Korean Threat (New Steps in U.S. Policy)

       Pressuring North Korea (Evaluating Options)

       President Donald Trump on Current Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

       A Message to the Congress of the United States on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea

       Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea

       Statement from the President on North Korea’s Second ICBM Launch

       Statement by President Donald J. Trump on North Korea

       About the Authors

      North Korea’s Military Threat

       Table of Contents

      Summary

       Table of Contents

      Since the inception of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948, the Pyongyang regime has had two national strategic objectives: (1) the perpetuation of the regime; and (2) reunification of the Korean Peninsula under North Korea’s control. Militarism has remained an essential aspect of the DPRK throughout its existence, and the armed forces constitute a central element of the regime. The Korean People’s Army (KPA), the name given to all services of North Korea’s military, is the core element for the realization of North Korea's national strategy. This strategy calls for giving priority to military issues over everything else and the DPRK constitutes the most militarized state on earth measured by a variety of indicators.

      The KPA emerged from guerrilla origins in the 1920s and then evolved into a hybrid force with elements of Soviet and Chinese doctrines and organization. It has adjusted as a result of learning from conflicts waged elsewhere in the world. This tradition embraces the concept of self-reliance and self-sufficiency consistent with the DPRK ideology of Juche.

      North Korean military doctrine has shifted dramatically away from the doctrine of regular warfare to a doctrine that embraced People's War. Kim Il Sung espoused “Four Military Lines”: (1) arm the entire population; (2) fortify the entire country; (3) train the entire army as a "cadre army"; and (4) modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the principle of Juche in national defense. Military doctrine was refined further to incorporate the concepts of “combined operations” and “two-front war.” The combined operations doctrine called for the integration of guerrilla warfare operations (small unit) with conventional ground force operations (large unit). This integrated doctrine probably has been modified to include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The two-front war doctrine calls for close coordination of conventional frontline operations with guerrilla and special operations deep within South Korea and possibly elsewhere. The First Front traditionally has been the massive conventional KPA force along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), while the focus for the Second Front has been the rear area of South Korea.

      To support these objectives and doctrine, since the end of the Korean War the KPA has developed into a massive armed force, 1.2 million strong, with substantial military capabilities — both conventional and unconventional. The KPA is the world’s fourth largest military in terms of manpower, with the world’s largest Special Operation Forces (SOF) and submarine fleet. Some 40 percent of the populace serve in some military, paramilitary, or defense-related industry and can be mobilized easily for war.

      In addition to sizeable conventional forces, North Korea has significant WMD and ballistic missile programs. Nuclear weapons almost certainly were on Kim Il Sung’s mind from 1945 onward. He was impressed by the power of the bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both in terms of their destructive capacity and their value as a political weapon. The DPRK’s quest for a nuclear program began in the 1950s. Pyongyang has multiple reasons for keeping the program and no obvious good or compelling reasons to give it up.

      North Korea possesses at least enough plutonium to make a handful of nuclear bombs. Still, it is entirely possible that Pyongyang does not have a weapon.

      The evidence from the October 9, 2006, underground explosion remains inconclusive, and the authors estimate that the DPRK has anywhere from zero to 13 nuclear weapons. North Korea has good reasons to play a game of “nuclear ambiguity.” Nevertheless, prudence demands that the United States and its allies proceed on the assumption