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and the role of local actors.¹⁹ In fact, local actors are integral to the outcomes of every aspect of the peace process, from agenda setting through implementation. Peacebuilders are involved at the will of local actors and, by necessity, must work within the constraints set forth by them. As noted by Miles Kahler, “their [peacebuilders’] programs become part of an intricate set of political calculations on the part of existing elites and their rivals. Whatever the asymmetries in power, local actors possess bargaining power and often use it effectively.”²⁰ This bargaining power may occur through either formal or informal power at the negotiating table. As Roman Krznaric demonstrates in the case of Guatemala, the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF), the country’s most important business organization, wielded significant influence over the socioeconomic content of the accords despite not being a direct party to the negotiations.²¹

      While local peacebuilding actors may include the state, armed opposition forces, civil society, and other political actors, elites often have the most influence on peacebuilding. Depending on the case, local elites may include economic elites, political elites, military elites, or some nexus of the three.²² The preferences, or desired outcomes, and capacity of local elites engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding have been long neglected in both peacebuilding literature and the critical responses to it. Yet local elite preferences have a significant impact on peace processes and peacebuilding, more specifically. The two most obvious ways that elite preferences shape peace processes are through their desire to maintain the status quo and their control of state resources and patronage networks. It is, perhaps, not surprising that elites seek to preserve their interests during peace processes, which often seek to alter the status quo. As David Roberts notes, elite entrenchment is a characteristic of many postconflict societies.²³ While one result of this entrenchment may be institutional reform, patterns of patronage and clientelism continue to dominate political culture in these countries. In its most benign form, elite entrenchment can result in increased polarization and may undermine democratic governance. At its worst, elite entrenchment may result in the resuscitation of conflict as elites attempt to retain power and fight proposed reforms.²⁴

      Far from being impotent actors at the mercy of international institutions, local elites often find ways to use the peacebuilding process to (re)consolidate or establish their control. Elites may feign interest in reforms to appease peacebuilders in order to gain or maintain access to resources without ever intending to undertake liberalizing reforms or by undermining reforms through informal structures.²⁵ Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher argue that the interactions between state elites, who seek to maximize their own interests, and peacebuilders shape the content of negotiations and determine the outcomes of peacebuilding.²⁶ The authors describe a range of potential outcomes of this interaction, as defined by the extent of the antagonistic relationship between peacebuilders and local elites. The authors argue that most cases result in “compromised peacebuilding,” where “state elites accept the legitimacy of the peacebuilders’ reforms in exchange for international assistance and legitimacy but seek to preserve their self-interest.”²⁷ Under this model, state elites work with peacebuilders to jointly determine policies. The result is an outcome that promotes reform while protecting the interests of the status quo.²⁸ In a more recent work, Barnett, Songying Fang, and Zürcher elaborate on compromised peacebuilding by employing a game-theoretic model to examine the outcome of bargaining between peacebuilders, elites, and secondary elites. Not surprisingly, divergence between the peacebuilders’ ideal outcome and elites’ preference toward the status quo leads to compromised peacebuilding and, as such, contributes to illiberal democracy.²⁹ That said, the authors do not argue that compromised peacebuilding is necessarily detrimental to future democratic development but may create the basis for it.

      One result of this bargaining between local elites and peacebuilders may be hybridity, a condition “where liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors coexist, interact, and even clash.”³⁰ The literature on hybridity and hybrid governance seeks to explain peacebuilding outcomes as the by-product of the liberal peacebuilding agenda and local actors and culture.³¹ It can also, as Richmond demonstrates, serve as a critique about peacebuilding’s failure to engage the local.³² Hybridity is useful in explaining the wide variety of outcomes seen in postconflict peacebuilding, as most cases exist on the continuum between liberal and illiberal.³³ In its most illiberal form, hybrid governance may result in state capture by economic elites while still possessing some features of democracy.

       Elites and Capture

      The literature on state capture yields interesting insights for our understanding of the role of elites in peacebuilding. Derived from the literature on regulatory capture, which deals with the influence of firms (or interest groups) on policy outcomes, capture theory has recently been applied by theorists to examine corruption in transitional states and economies.³⁴ State capture occurs when powerful individuals or firms are able to influence the content and application of public policy in accordance with their own interests in exchange for bribes to public officials.³⁵ It is a system of corruption characterized by a “perversion of the rules of the game, through corruption, to the benefit of the captors, rather than for society as a whole.”³⁶ Recent studies on state capture indicate that it can affect a wide range of institutions, including the legislature, executive judiciary, ministries, and security. But elites do not just capture the state through bribes or special-interest groups; they occupy positions within the government. This capture may be facilitated by the overlapping economic and political interests of elites, or when “preexisting networks and new economic elites have secured positions of dominance in the transition environment creating a new fusion of economic and political power.”³⁷ Because states in transition and newly democratic states may be particularly vulnerable to capture, it may also help to illuminate obstacles in peacebuilding.³⁸

      There is relatively little literature exploring elite capture in peacebuilding, though recent scholarship on corruption and peacebuilding helps illuminate many of the same challenges.³⁹ In addition to compromised peacebuilding, “captured peacebuilding” is one of the outcomes identified by Barnett and Zürcher. In captured peacebuilding, state and local elites are able to redirect the distribution of assistance so that it maximizes their interests.⁴⁰ Beyond merely protecting the status quo, this scenario allows elites to direct resources brought in by the peace process to reinforce those interests for years to come. In her work on decentralization and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, Melissa Labonte explores the problem of elite capture and its effects on peacebuilding. According to Labonte, elite capture occurs “when elites control, shape or manipulate decision-making processes, institutions, or structures in ways that serve their self-interests and priorities.”⁴¹ Elite capture is made possible by a variety of factors, including institutional design and enduring structures and power relations, that may transcend or limit prospects for peacebuilding and democratization. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson also find that some structures (particularly economic institutions) persist even in the face of radical change. In their explanation of “captured democracy,” de jure power (by right) is offset by de facto power (in fact) of elites, resulting in “captured democracy.”⁴² These findings reinforce the importance of path dependence and the legacies of deeply rooted institutions.⁴³ As old networks merge with new elites during the transition, it is not only the preferences of elites during the peacebuilding processes that influence outcomes but the cumulative effect of past preferences that have shaped structures within which peacebuilding occurs. As such, elites may adopt the language of peacebuilding and liberalism while retaining a political culture of patronage and clientelism. As David Roberts puts it, “the norm trumps the nomenclature.”⁴⁴

      I would add that elite capture need not be the result of a transition but may actually precede it. In the case of El Salvador, elites captured the state through a political party before the negotiation and implementation of peace accords. As Ho-Won Jeong notes, incumbent governments that remained in power through the transitions enjoyed significant advantages by controlling state institutions and resources. Relatively few incumbent governments have lost elections in the immediate aftermath of conflict, giving them significant leverage over the peacebuilding process.⁴⁵