Историческая литература

Различные книги в жанре Историческая литература

Six Victories

Vincent P. O'Hara

Six Victories relates one of the most interesting and instructive naval campaigns of World War II: the Mediterranean war on traffic in the fall and winter of 1941-42. It is a cautionary tale of how sea power was practiced, and how it literally shifted 180 degrees overnight. The book is based on British and Italian archival sources. It emphasizes strategic context, the role of intelligence, and the campaign’s logistics. It is well-paced and entertaining but also authoritative. The book’s conclusions are controversial but based on compelling evidence.
In October 1941 the British Admiralty based a surface strike force in Malta to attack Axis sea lanes between Italy and Africa. Aided by ULTRA intelligence, submarines and bombers based in Malta, this force dominated the Central Mediterranean. From the end of October through the middle of December 1941 less than third of the supplies shipped from Italian ports arrived in Libya. Shortages of ammunition and fuel finally compelled the Afrika Korps to retreat four hundred miles. Then, in the space of thirty hours, this all changed. First, Italian naval forces broke the blockade by fighting through a major convoy that arrived in time to blunt the British advance; next, the strike force plowed into a minefield laid by Italian cruisers; and finally, in a daring attack, Italian commandos crippled the Mediterranean Fleet’s battleships in port. The swing in fortune was immediate and dramatic.
Six Victories shows how information provided by ULTRA was often offset by the Italian ability to read British codes and take corrective actions even as British strikes forces were approaching their target. It examines how the Italians improved the protection of their traffic and how, in conjunction with Germany, came to dominate the Central Mediterranean and isolate Malta. The book the ends with the triumph of Axis sea power as expressed in the late March 1942 Second Battle of Sirte which initiated a period of Axis domination in the Central Mediterranean.
Six Victories breaks new ground in the historiography of World War II. It relates lessons that are relevant today and should be required reading for all who practice the art of power at sea as well as those who want to understand the intricate and interrelated factors that are the foundations of military success. It is also a good and compelling story.

I Was Chaplain on the Franklin

Joseph T. O'Callahan, S. J.

“Sudden death was everywhere. . .” On the morning of March 19, 1945, about fifty miles off the coast of Japan, the aircraft carrier USS Franklin was bombed by Japanese aircraft. Two heavy bombs penetrated the hangar deck killing everyone inside. The planes on the flight deck were knocked into the air, their whirling propellers smashing gas tanks which spilled 17,000 gallons of gasoline. Fires raged from stem to stern on three decks. For four interminable hours, explosions rocked the Franklin. All communications, fire mains and power were gone. Into the thick of the choking smoke and fury came a hero with a white cross on his helmet. «Padre» to the Catholic, «Rabbi Joe» to the Jewish boys, Chaplain O'Callahan was «Father» to everyone on board. Father O'Callahan tells of his own experiences, recapturing the perilous and heroic drama of the Franklin. He leads you through blazing decks to observe gallant engineers and pharmacists, doctors and stewards man the battle stations. He recalls moments of his own inspired leadership. He describes a host of dramatic episodes on a stricken ship that refused to sink. When the Franklin finally limped into Pearl Harbor, it was the most damaged ship ever to reach port. Its casualty list was the highest in Navy history–432 dead and over 1,000 wounded. «Big Ben» was bombed, battered, bruised and bent, but like the spirit of the men on board, she was not broken. For his conspicuous gallantry above and beyond the call of duty, Father O'Callahan won the only Congressional Medal of Honor ever awarded a navy chaplain. His inspiring account of the Franklin’s travail is more than a story of heroism, war, and men. It is a powerful and unforgettable story of faith.

Foundations of Russian Military Flight, 1885-1925

James K. Libbey

Foundations of Russian Military Flight focuses on the early use of balloons and aircraft by the Russian military. The best early Russian aircraft included flying boats designed by Dimitrii Grigorovich and large reconnaissance-bombers created by Igor Sikorsky. As World War I began, the Imperial Russian Navy made use of aircraft more quickly than the army. Indeed, the navy established a precursor to the aircraft carrier. The Imperial Russian Army came to respect over time the work of aircraft that evolved from reconnaissance and bomber to fighter planes. Over 250 army pilots during the war received awards of high distinction for their wartime flights. After the 1917 revolution, both the new Bolshevik government and the reactionary White forces created air arms to combat each other. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union and Germany negotiated agreements that allowed Germany to violate the Treaty of Versailles by building military aircraft and training German military pilots in the USSR. This provided the Soviet Union access to the latest aviation technology and prevented them from falling too far behind the West in this crucial sphere.

Flight Risk

Forrest L. Marion

After 2005, the United States and coalition partners led an air advisory campaign to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF). From the 1920s Afghanistan maintained a smallish air arm that depended heavily upon outside assistance. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the 1990s witnessed the splintering of Afghan air power among mujahideen groups, and in 2001 U.S. air power neutralized what remained of Afghan air assets. By 2005, U.S.-coalition rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan included the AAF and in 2007 a formal joint / combined entity, led by a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, began air advisor work with Afghan airmen. The AAF expected to grow to 8,000 personnel and 150 aircraft by 2016. Between 2007 and 2011, air advising efforts made modest progress in terms of infrastructures, personnel and aircraft accessions, and various training courses. But by 2010, advisors increasingly viewed AAF command and control (C2) as a problem area that required significant improvement if a professional air force was to be built. In the spring of 2011, major institutional changes to AAF C2 procedures were being introduced when nine U.S. air advisors were killed. The attack was the worst single-incident loss of U.S. Air Force personnel in a deployed location since 1996 and the worst insider-attack since 2001. The post-attack investigation failed to uncover evidence of organized corruption contributing to the attack despite the well-known presence of a Criminal Patronage Network as well as certain power brokers within the AAF itself (all unacknowledged in the original report). The investigation was the victim of command pressure at the U.S. three-star level. From mid-2011 through 2015, air advisors focused on force protection as well as teaching English, training Afghan airmen, and adjusting U.S.-coalition plans to a shifting AAF inventory. As time wore on, the cultural chasm between Afghanistan and the West became more apparent, highlighted by Afghan senior leaders' traditional practice of personal-based C2 through the use of their cell-phones to re-task most AAF aircraft sorties (especially Mi-17s) outside of established procedures and C2 entities. Many sorties were invisible to the air advisors, and others were suspected of transporting illicit goods. Under such circumstances, flying training sorties of AAF aviators failed to keep pace with the air campaign plan. In short, culturally informed ways of doing business precluded AAF professionalization. As of 2015, the dilemma continued with no end in sight to an air advisory mission of uncertain long-term value.

After Jutland

James V. Goldrick

After Jutland analyses the naval war in Northern European waters following the critical, but inconclusive Battle of Jutland. A popular misconception is that Jutland marked the end of the operational career of the German High Sea Fleet and the beginning of a period of stagnation for both it and its opponent, the Grand Fleet. The reality is much more complex. The German battle fleet was quiescent for much of the time in the North Sea, but it supported an ambitious amphibious campaign in the Baltic while a bitter commerce war was waged by U-Boats and the light craft fought a grueling campaign in the waters of the English Channel and the Belgian Coast. After Jutland focuses primarily on the Royal Navy as the dominant maritime force, but it also analyses the struggles of the beleaguered German Navy as it sought to find ways to break the tightening stranglehold of the blockade and undermine Allied control of the world's oceans – and of British home waters in particular. The continuing conflict in the Baltic will also be explored as the Germans increased the pressure on the Russian territory and the Russian fleet while the latter, despite its descent into revolution, still struggled to provide an effective counter to the Imperial German Navy. The Royal Navy learned much from Jutland and applied those lessons to good effect. It greatly improved the way that ships were organized for battle, as well as developing new tactics. There were also great leaps in communications and in command and control, while both aviation and undersea operations, including mine warfare, developed at breakneck pace. The Imperial German Navy made its own changes as a result of Jutland. Indeed, both Germany and Russia undertook much more naval innovation in the final years of the conflict than is often realized. By 1918, all the protagonists were fighting what was, in every way, a multi-dimensional maritime war that was the forerunner of naval conflict for the remainder of the twentieth century. The period also saw the entry to the conflict of the United States and the increasing commitment of the United States Navy. USN units saw hard service before the Armistice of November 1918. Many of the foundations of success in the next war were laid by the USN at this time. The learning curve was steep as officers and sailors alike sought to catch up on the experience of nearly three years of conflict, but they brought new methods and new applications of technology to the operational problems with which their coalition partners had been struggling. This included the Sixth Battle Squadron, which was rapidly assimilated into the Grand Fleet, absorbing the hard-won knowledge of their British colleagues, but applying some of their own ideas.

Uncommon Valor

Stephen L. Moore

Uncommon Valor is a look into the formation and operation of an advanced Special Forces recon company during the Vietnam War. Code-named the Studies and Observations Group, SOG was the most covert U.S. military unit in its time and contained only volunteers from such elite units as the Army’s Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and Air Force Air Commandos. SOG warriors operated in small teams, going behind enemy lines in Laos and Cambodia and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, tasked with performing special reconnaissance, sabotaging North Vietnamese Army ammunition, attempting to rescue downed U.S. pilots and other black ops missions. During that time, Forward Operating Base-2’s (FOB-2's) recon company became the most highly decorated unit of the Vietnam War, with five of its men earning the Medal of Honor and eight earning the Distinguished Service Cross-America's second highest military award for valor. Purple Hearts were earned by SOG veterans at a pace unparalleled in American wars of the twentieth century, with casualties at times exceeding 100 percent. One, Bob Howard, was wounded on fourteen different occasions, received eight Purple Hearts, was written up after three different missions for the Medal of Honor, and emerged from Vietnam as the most highly decorated soldier since World War II's Audie Murphy.

Catkiller 3-2

Raymond G. Caryl

Catkiller 3-2 provides unique insights into the role of the tactical air controller, airborne (TACA) in I Corps as seen through the eyes of one of the pilots who flew low-flying, unarmed, single-engine aircraft in support of Marine ground units during the Vietnam War. When Gen. William Westmoreland changed the Marines’ role in I Corps into a combat one, the Marines found themselves in need of more fixed wing aircraft to handle the TACA missions. The advance party of the Army’s 220th Reconnaissance Aircraft Company (RAC) arrived in Vietnam in late June 1965 thinking they were going to be assigned to III Corps Tactical Zone. However, because of the shortage of existing Marine Birddogs, the 220th was immediately reassigned to I Corps and came under the operational control of the Marines.
No other work details the tactics, restrictions, aerial maneuvers, and dangers experienced by the Army pilots and Marine aerial observers flying these missions. As young lieutenants and captains, they had at their beck and call as much authority to request and control artillery and air strikes as ground commanders of much higher rank. Raymond G. Caryl provides unrivaled examples of the cultural mores, attitudes, and recreational activity of these young pilots and observers supporting the ground forces.

American Sea Power in the Old World

William N. Still, Jr.

This classic study examines the deployment of U.S. naval vessels in European and Near Eastern waters from the end of the Civil War until the United States declared war in April 1917. Initially these ships were employed to visit various ports from the Baltic Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and Constantinople (today Istanbul), for the primary purpose of showing the flag. From the 1890s on, most of the need for the presence of the American warships occurred in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Unrest in the Ottoman Empire and particularly the Muslim hostility and threats to Armenians led to calls for protection. This would continue into the years of World War I. In 1905, the Navy Department ended the permanent stationing of a squadron in European waters.
From then until the U.S. declaration of war in 1917, individual ships, detached units, and special squadrons were at times deployed in European waters. In 1908, the converted yacht Scorpion was sent as station ship (stationnaire) to Constantinople where she would remain, operating in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea until 1928. Upon the outbreak of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson ordered cruisers to northern European waters and the Mediterranean to protect American interests. These warships, however, did more than protect American interests. They would evacuate thousands of refugees, American tourists, Armenians, Jews, and Italians after Italy entered the conflict on the side of the Allies.

Hell to Pay

D. M. Giangreco

Two years before the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped bring a quick end to hostilities in the summer of 1945, U.S. planners began work on Operation Downfall, codename for the Allied invasions of Kyushu and Honshu, in the Japanese home islands. While other books have examined Operation Downfall, D. M. Giangreco offers the most complete and exhaustively researched consideration of the plans and their implications. He explores related issues of the first operational use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, including the controversy surrounding estimates of potential U.S. casualties.Following years of intense research at numerous archives, Giangreco now paints a convincing and horrific picture of the veritable hell that awaited invader and defender. In the process, he demolishes the myths that Japan was trying to surrender during the summer of 1945 and that U.S. officials later wildly exaggerated casualty figures to justify using the atomic bombs to influence the Soviet Union. As Giangreco writes, “Both sides were rushing headlong toward a disastrous confrontation in the Home Islands in which poison gas and atomic weapons were to be employed as MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Charles Willoughby, succinctly put it, ‘a hard and bitter struggle with no quarter asked or given.’”Hell to Pay examines the invasion of Japan in light of the large body of Japanese and American operational and tactical planning documents the author unearthed in familiar and obscure archives. It includes postwar interrogations and reports that senior Japanese commanders and their staffs were ordered to produce for General MacArthur’s headquarters. This groundbreaking history counters the revisionist interpretations questioning the rationale for the use of the atomic bomb and shows that President Truman’s decision was based on real estimates of the enormous human cost of a conventional invasion.This revised edition of Hell to Pay expands on several areas covered in the previous book and deals with three new topics: U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the war against Imperial Japan; U.S., Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion and defense of the northernmost Home Island of Hokkaido; and Operation Blacklist, the three-phase insertion of American occupation forces into Japan. It also contains additional text, relevant archival material, supplemental photos, and new maps, making this the definitive edition of an important historical work.

Incidents at Sea

David F. Winkler

Free to patrol the skies and surface of the high seas under international law, U.S. and Soviet naval and air forces made daily direct contact during the Cold War. Often confrontational and occasionally violent, air-to-air contacts alone killed more than one hundred Soviet and American aviators during the Truman and Eisenhower years. Diplomacy to curtail the hostility produced mixed results. In the 1960s, the Soviet navy challenged U.S. naval dominance worldwide and collisions and charges of harassment became common. In 1972, the two nations signed an Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) that established navy-to-navy channels to resolve issues. This agreement, still in effect between the U.S. and Russia, is the focus of David Winkler’s study.
Here Winkler argues that Soviet and American naval officers, sharing bonds inherent in seamen, were able to put ideology aside and speak frankly. Working together, they limited incidents that have had unfortunate consequences. The process they established served as a model for similar accords between other maritime nations. With the emergence of China has a maritime power, elements of the US-Russia accord were adopted to assure peaceful interactions between American and Chinese naval forces.
Drawing on previously unavailable State Department files, declassified Navy policy papers, discussions with former top officials, interviews with individuals who were involved in incidents, Winkler details the U.S.-Soviet naval relationship through the end of the Cold War and beyond. Since the publication of Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union by the Naval Institute Press in 2000, confrontations at sea still occur, but efforts continue to limit their frequency and impact on international relations. In this volume, Winkler expands the narrative to bring the story to the present, detailing occasional U.S.-Russia naval force interactions such as the April 2016 Russian aircraft “buzzings” of the USS Donald Cook in the Baltic. He also details China’s efforts to militarize the South China Sea, claim sovereignty over waters within their economic exclusion zone (EEZ), and the U.S. Navy’s continuing efforts to counter these challenges to the freedom of navigation.
Overall, because of the regimens put in place, incidents at sea have become a rarity. While those who negotiated these regimens deserve recognition, it is the seaman and aviators who operate on the world’s oceans who deserve the ultimate acclaim for their professionalism in assuring that the agreed upon protocols were implemented.